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Abdula vs. Guiani

Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. L-36142, March 31 1973 - 50 SCRA 33

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.

This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.

Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.




Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.


ISSUES:
  1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
  2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
  3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.
  4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
  5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution.

It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.

Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites.

This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.

The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.

The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.




Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102.

Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is  not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.

The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

Read more case digests here:
Tolentino vs. Comelec
Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
Philippine Bar Association vs. Comelec
Ople vs. Torres
Frivaldo vs. Comelec






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