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Abdula vs. Guiani

Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor foun...

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to advise him about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After enumerating the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.



As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the complainant himself.

After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant. 

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.

Read: De Guzman vs. Comelec

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200 or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

HELD:

No.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

Read: Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 4200.


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