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Abdula vs. Guiani

Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima

BRILLANTES VS. CONCEPCION

BRILLANTES VS. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

FACTS:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. On April 28, 2004, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6712 which was captioned as GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS.

However, the petitioner assails that there is no provision under Rep. Act No. 8436 which authorizes the COMELEC to engage in the biometrics/computerized system of validation of voters (Phase I) and a system of electronic transmission of election results (Phase III).  Even assuming for the nonce that all the three (3) phases are duly authorized, they must complement each other as they are not distinct and separate programs but mere stages of one whole scheme.  Consequently, considering the failed implementation of Phases I and II, there is no basis at all for the respondent COMELEC to still push through and pursue with Phase III.

The petitioner essentially posits that the counting and consolidation of votes contemplated under Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436 refers to the official COMELEC count under the fully automated system and not any kind of “unofficial” count via electronic transmission of advanced results as now provided under the assailed resolution.



ISSUES:

Whether the petitioner and the petitioners-intervenors have standing to      sue;
Assuming that they have standing, whether the issues they raise are political in nature over which the Court has no jurisdiction;
Assuming the issues are not political, whether Resolution No. 6712 is void:

  i. for preempting the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President;
  ii. for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;”
  iii. for disregarding Rep. Acts Nos. 8173, 8436 and 7166 which authorize only the citizens’ arm to use an election return for an “unofficial” count;
  iv. for violation of Sec. 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, requiring not less than thirty (30) days notice of the use of new technological and electronic devices; and,
   v. for lack of constitutional or statutory basis.

HELD:

First: The implementation of the assailed resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where the petitioners seek to restrain the respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

Second: The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondent COMELEC that the issue involved in the present petition is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review.  As the leading case of Tañada vs. Cuenco put it, political questions are concerned with “issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The issue raised in the present petition does not merely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on its alleged disregard for applicable statutory and constitutional provisions.  In other words, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention are questioning the legality of the respondent COMELEC’s administrative issuance will not preclude this Court from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing Resolution No. 6712.

Third: The Court rules in the affirmative.

The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.  Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution

The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” (Par. 1, Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.)

The assailed resolution disregards existing laws which authorize solely the duly-accredited citizens’ arm to conduct the “unofficial” counting of votes.  Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an “unofficial” counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections.  No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an “unofficial” count.
Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for “unofficial” tabulations of votes.  Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices. 

The assailed resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis.  That respondent COMELEC is the sole body tasked to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall” (Section 2(1), Article IX.) and to ensure “free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” (Section 2(4), Article IX.) is beyond cavil.  That it possesses the power to promulgate rules and regulations in the performance of its constitutional duties is, likewise, undisputed.  However, the duties of the COMELEC under the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 7166, and other election laws are carried out, at all times, in its official capacity. There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC to undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically.

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