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Abdula vs. Guiani

Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor foun...
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Feliciano vs. Pasicolan

Feliciano vs. Pasicolan
GR No. L-14657, July 31, 1961

FACTS:

Pablo Feliciano, was one of the eighteen persons charged with the crime of kidnapping with murder.

Upon learning of the filing of said information and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, the petitioner went into hiding.

However, Attorney Filemon Cajator, at the instance of the petitioner's wife, filed in the case a motion asking that the Court fix at P10,000.00 the amount of the bond for petitioner's release pending trial. Feliciano vs. Pasicolan



The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing thereof was premature as the petitioner had not yet been arrested. the respondent Judge dismissed petitioner's motion, on the ground that "pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit him to bail."

Hence, the instant proceeding.

Read: Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to bail. Feliciano vs. Pasicolan

HELD:

The rule is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. Feliciano vs. Pasicolan

Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security "required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law," Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. 
In the instant case, the petitioner upon learning that an amended information charging him and seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, immediately went into hiding and until now is at large. Feliciano vs. Pasicolan

Read: Tucay vs. Domagas

Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial.

It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail. Feliciano vs. Pasicolan
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