Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima
FRANCISCO VS. FERNANDO
G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its “wet flag scheme” (“Flag Scheme”).
Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme:
(1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it;
(2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking;
(3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and
(4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was valid.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when:
(1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category.
Nor is there merit to petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the “transcendental importance” of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation.
On the Flag Scheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations.
After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its “wet flag scheme” (“Flag Scheme”).
Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme:
(1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it;
(2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking;
(3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and
(4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was valid.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when:
(1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category.
Nor is there merit to petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the “transcendental importance” of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation.
On the Flag Scheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations.
After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.