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Abdula vs. Guiani

Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima

Almeda vs. Villaluz

Almeda vs. Villaluz
GR No. L-31665, August 6, 1975

FACTS:

Petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle.

The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. Almeda vs. Villaluz

Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him.

This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. Almeda vs. Villaluz




At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda.

The trial court granted the respondent fiscal's motion in open court. Almeda vs. Villaluz
An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.

Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the document.

The petitioner forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open court. Almeda vs. Villaluz

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge has the authority to require a strict cash bond and disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty.

Read: Feliciano vs. Pasicolan

HELD:

As defined in Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is
the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. Almeda vs. Villaluz

In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.

This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior absconding. Almeda vs. Villaluz

Read: Tucay vs. Domagas

In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that
EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED.
This is logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself.

We have thus held that
where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.
The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. Almeda vs. Villaluz

The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government.

The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Almeda vs. Villaluz
Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.

And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. Almeda vs. Villaluz
This is clearly deducible from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. — At any time after the amount of bail is fixed by order, the defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the nearest collector of internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the court a proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody. Money thus deposited, shall be applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be returned to the defendant.



Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond. Almeda vs. Villaluz

But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety bond.

Based on the petitioner's past record.

Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. Almeda vs. Villaluz

First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level.

Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements.

Third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution.

"Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." Almeda vs. Villaluz


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