Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima
Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
GR No. 166886, July 30 2008
FACTS:
Jimmy A. Uy (Uy) filed a trademark application with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) for registration of the trademark "BARBIE" for use on confectionary products, such as milk, chocolate, candies, milk bar and chocolate candies. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
Mattel, Inc. (Mattel), filed a Notice of Opposition against Uy's "Barbie" trademark as the latter was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, doll clothes and doll accessories, toys and other similar commercial products.
Public respondent Estrellita B. Abelardo, the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, IPO, rendered a Decision dismissing Mattel's opposition and giving due course to Uy’s application for the registration of the trademark "Barbie" used on confectionary products. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
Read: La Chemise Lacoste. VS. Fernandez
The Director held that there was no confusing similarity between the two competing marks because the goods were non-competing or unrelated.
Mattel filed MR which was denied then it appealed the decision with the Director General.
Public respondent Emma C. Francisco, the Director General, rendered a Decision denying the appeal on the ground that there was no proof on record that Mattel had ventured into the production of chocolates and confectionary products under the trademark "Barbie" to enable it to prevent Uy from using an identical "Barbie" trademark on said goods; that the records were bereft of the fact that the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks (BOT) had already declared the subject trademark application abandoned due to the non-filing of the Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) by Uy. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application is deemed withdrawn or abandoned for failure to file the Declaration of Actual Use.
HELD:
The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. Uy's declaration in his Comment and Memorandum before this Court that he has not filed the DAU as mandated by pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 8293 is a judicial admission that he has effectively abandoned or withdrawn any right or interest in his trademark. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
Section 124.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides:
Read: Coffee Partners, Inc. vs. San Francisco Coffee and Roastery, Inc.
A judicial admission binds the person who makes the same. In the same vein, an admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true.
Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
In the present case, Mattel is seeking a ruling on whether Uy's "Barbie" trademark is confusingly similar to it's (Mattel's) "Barbie" trademark. Given Uy's admission that he has effectively abandoned or withdrawn any rights or interest in his trademark by his non-filing of the required DAU, there is no more actual controversy, or no useful purpose will be served in passing upon the merits of the case.
It would be unnecessary to rule on the trademark conflict between the parties. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
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GR No. 166886, July 30 2008
FACTS:
Jimmy A. Uy (Uy) filed a trademark application with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) for registration of the trademark "BARBIE" for use on confectionary products, such as milk, chocolate, candies, milk bar and chocolate candies. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
Mattel, Inc. (Mattel), filed a Notice of Opposition against Uy's "Barbie" trademark as the latter was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, doll clothes and doll accessories, toys and other similar commercial products.
Public respondent Estrellita B. Abelardo, the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, IPO, rendered a Decision dismissing Mattel's opposition and giving due course to Uy’s application for the registration of the trademark "Barbie" used on confectionary products. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
Read: La Chemise Lacoste. VS. Fernandez
The Director held that there was no confusing similarity between the two competing marks because the goods were non-competing or unrelated.
Mattel filed MR which was denied then it appealed the decision with the Director General.
Public respondent Emma C. Francisco, the Director General, rendered a Decision denying the appeal on the ground that there was no proof on record that Mattel had ventured into the production of chocolates and confectionary products under the trademark "Barbie" to enable it to prevent Uy from using an identical "Barbie" trademark on said goods; that the records were bereft of the fact that the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks (BOT) had already declared the subject trademark application abandoned due to the non-filing of the Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) by Uy. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application is deemed withdrawn or abandoned for failure to file the Declaration of Actual Use.
HELD:
The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. Uy's declaration in his Comment and Memorandum before this Court that he has not filed the DAU as mandated by pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 8293 is a judicial admission that he has effectively abandoned or withdrawn any right or interest in his trademark. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
Section 124.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides:
The applicant or the registrant shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect, as prescribed by the Regulations within three (3) years from the filing date of the application. Otherwise, the applicant shall be refused or the marks shall be removed from the Register by the Director.Moreover, Rule 204 of the Rules and Regulations on Trademarks provides:
Declaration of Actual Use. The Office will not require any proof of use in commerce in the processing of trademark applications.
However, without need of any notice from the Office, all applicants or registrants, shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect within three years, without possibility of extension, from the filing date of the application.
Otherwise, the application shall be refused or the mark shall be removed from the register by the Director motu propio.Meanwhile, Memorandum Circular No. BT 2K1-3-04 dated March 29, 2001 of the IPO provides:
2. For pending applications prosecuted under R.A. 166 we distinguish as follows:2.1. Based on use – must submit DAU and evidence of use on or before December 1, 2001, subject to a single six (6) month extension. (Sec. 3.2, Final Provisions of the Trademark Regulations, R.A. 8293, IPO Fee Structure and MC. No. BT Y2K-8-02)Uy's admission in his Comment and Memorandum of non-compliance with the foregoing requirements is a judicial admission and an admission against interest combined. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
Read: Coffee Partners, Inc. vs. San Francisco Coffee and Roastery, Inc.
A judicial admission binds the person who makes the same. In the same vein, an admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true.
Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
In the present case, Mattel is seeking a ruling on whether Uy's "Barbie" trademark is confusingly similar to it's (Mattel's) "Barbie" trademark. Given Uy's admission that he has effectively abandoned or withdrawn any rights or interest in his trademark by his non-filing of the required DAU, there is no more actual controversy, or no useful purpose will be served in passing upon the merits of the case.
It would be unnecessary to rule on the trademark conflict between the parties. Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco
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