Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima
Senate vs. Ermita
GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). Senate vs. Ermita
The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to various officials of the AFP for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005. Senate vs. Ermita
The AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga was also invited on that scheduled hearing but requested for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."
Likewise, Senate President Drilon received letters from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation requesting for the postponement or cancellation of the said scheduled hearing. Senate vs. Ermita
Read: Marcos vs. Manglapus
The AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga was also invited on that scheduled hearing but requested for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."
Likewise, Senate President Drilon received letters from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation requesting for the postponement or cancellation of the said scheduled hearing. Senate vs. Ermita
Read: Marcos vs. Manglapus
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
During the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him
that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005.
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation pushed through. Senate vs. Ermita
For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, who were among the officials who attended the hearing, were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, who were among the officials who attended the hearing, were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 464 is constitutional. Senate vs. Ermita
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 are declared void while Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, valid.
Read: Ople vs. Torres
Read: Ople vs. Torres
Section 1
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. Senate vs. Ermita
It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464.
The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are.
Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-Ã -vis Senate vs. Ermita
It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464.
The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are.
Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-Ã -vis Senate vs. Ermita
Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all.
Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour wherein the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour wherein the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Senate vs. Ermita
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Section 2(a)
Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. Senate vs. Ermita
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Senate vs. Ermita
Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged.
That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious.
It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. Senate vs. Ermita
Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged.
That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious.
It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. Senate vs. Ermita
Section 2(b) and Section 3
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. Senate vs. Ermita
Read: Oposa vs. Factoran
These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Read: Oposa vs. Factoran
These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
The Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege.
She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. Senate vs. Ermita
The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.
In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Senate vs. Ermita
She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. Senate vs. Ermita
The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.
In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Senate vs. Ermita
Therefore, when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.
This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. Senate vs. Ermita
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.