Abdula vs. Guiani G.R. No.: 118821, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 1 FACTS: The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Japal M. Guiani of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. The petitioners, Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula, were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 2376. The murder complaint alleged that the petitioners paid six other individuals for the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Initially, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao dismissed the murder charges against the petitioners and five other respondents due to lack of prima facie evidence. However, a separate information for murder was filed against one of the respondents, Kasan Mama. Subsequently, the case was ordered to be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. After additional evidence was presented, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima
IN RE: LETTER OF REYNATO PUNO
June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA
FACTS:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.
On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes”.
Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations Sedfrey Ordoñez as Vice Chairman. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary.
The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33.
Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of constitutional confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court).
In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice Puno’s request. The Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is directed to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number twelve (12) to number five (5). However, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that “no right provided under the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution”.
Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate, according to positioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the original statute.
Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by Executive Order No. 33 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior to Executive Order No. 33.
HELD:
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986. A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it”, or as “a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.”
It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state” and from there is derived “the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.”
These summarize the Aquino government’s position that its mandate is taken from “a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people.
A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was overthrown by the Aquino government. “A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a written constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution, comprise the legal order of that constitutional state.” It is assumed that the legal order remains as a “culture system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials.
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.
FACTS:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.
On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes”.
Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations Sedfrey Ordoñez as Vice Chairman. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary.
The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33.
Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of constitutional confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court).
In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice Puno’s request. The Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is directed to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number twelve (12) to number five (5). However, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that “no right provided under the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution”.
Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate, according to positioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the original statute.
Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by Executive Order No. 33 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior to Executive Order No. 33.
HELD:
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986. A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it”, or as “a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.”
It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state” and from there is derived “the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.”
These summarize the Aquino government’s position that its mandate is taken from “a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people.
A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was overthrown by the Aquino government. “A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a written constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution, comprise the legal order of that constitutional state.” It is assumed that the legal order remains as a “culture system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials.
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.